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I. INTRODUCTION 
The actions of the Respondents were not intended to preserve the nature of the 
neighborhood. "Preserve" means to keep something in its original state. Both the 1980 
CC&R's and the 2007 Amended CC&R's allowed for unlimited rental. 1 Thus to preserve 
the nature of the neighborhood, no amendment would be required. 
The Respondents assert the action had to be taken because of "persons that were 
disruptive and violative (sic) of the Association rules: e.g., parking in reserved parking 
spaces or other areas where parking was restricted, blocking traffic, and disturbing the 
peace and quiet enjoyment of other residents of their respective properties. "2 
Respondents' assertion is a red herring. Both the 1980 CC&R's and the 2007 Amended 
CC&R's contained all of the tools necessary for the HOA Board to address theft, 
disturbing the peace, and parking. 3 
Finally, Respondent misstates the fundamental question in this appeal as only one 
dealing with the upholding and enforcing of the 2007 CC&R's. Respondent must make 
this misstatement, and seek to divert the Court from the real issue. Unlike in Shawver, 
Appellant challenges the validity and authority of the amendment provision of the 
1 R. 000119, Art. III, § 1 ("Each Lot shall be used for single family residential purposes only, on an 
ownership, rental or lease basis ..• "); R. I 36, Art. III, § 1 {"Each Lot shall be used for single family 
residential purposes only, on an ownership, rental or lease basis •.. "). 
2 Respondents' Briet: pg. I (Dec. 18, 2014) ("Respondents' Brief'). 
3 R. 000137, Art. III, § l{b) ("Unenclosed parking spaces are restricted to use for parking of operative 
motor vehicles; parking on any portion of the Common Area shall be regulated by the Board ... The Board 
may require removal of ... any other vehicle, equipment or item improperly parked or stored. If the same is 
not removed the Board may cause removal at the risk and expense of the Owner thereof. Any other item or 
equipment determined by the Board to be objectionable may be similarly removed."). 
R. 000138, Art. III,§ l(h) ("No noxious or offensive activity shall be carried on in any Dwelling Unit or 
Common Area, nor shall anything be done therein which may be or become an annoyance to other Owners. 
R. 000138, Art. Ill,§ l(k) ("Either the Board or the Members of the Corporation upon a majority vote of 
the Board or the Members, as the case may be, are empowered to pass, amend and revoke detailed 
administrative rules and regulations, "House Rules," or rules of conduct necessary or convenient from time 
to time to insure compliance with the general guidelines of this Section.") 
I 
CC&R's, and the District Court's failure to conduct any analysis of Appellant's 
challenge. 4 
The District Court's failure to address this central issue mandates reversal, with 
direction to enter judgment in favor of Appellant. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. A Principled Application of Idaho Law Mandates RevenaL 
Respondents' recitation of Idaho law artfully fails to address the central issue of 
this appeal. Appellant's challenge to the validity of the amendment provision was 
ignored by the District Court. The District Court relied on Shawver without addressing 
the undisputed fact that the issue raised here was never addressed in Shawver. 
As the parties are aware, according to Shawver, restrictive covenants may 
provide for a method of abrogating or modifying such agreement, as for 
example by vote of a certain proportion of the property owners, and "such 
agreements are valid under the law."5 
Appellant specifically identified Justice Shroeder's quote during oral argument to 
the District Court: 
The Supreme Court decided Shawver on the issue of the breach of the sale 
agreement They decided Shawver on the issue of good faith and fair 
dealing with respect to the sale agreement. And they decided Shawver on 
the issue of whether or not the sale agreement was subject to the restrictive 
covenants. 
Specifically the issue that you have in this case, Judge, was never 
addressed by the Court in Shawver and it's plainly stated at page 362 and 
363 of the decision. "The Shawvers do not challenge the validity of the 
amendment provisions contained in the original recorded CC&Rs. "6 
4 No Court in Idaho has directly addressed this issue. It is critical to note that Justice Schroeder 
acknowledged that Shawver had not challenged the validity of the amendment provision of the CC&R's: 
"The Shawvers do not challenge the validity of the amendment provision contained in the original recorded 
CC & Rs or the fact that the Second Amended CC & Rs were properly adopted in compliance with that 
r,ovision. Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, l.l.C., 140 Idaho 3S4, 362-63, 93 P.3d 68S, 693-94 (2004). 
SJ Transcript, p. 36, L. 12-17. 
6 SJ Transcript, p. 21, L. 24- p. 22, L. I. 
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The District Court failed to acknowledge either the distinction, or the issue, and 
proceeded to make its decision without analysis or application of the correct principles of 
Idaho law. 
1. The District Court Failed to Determine The Original Intent of 
the Bargain Contained in the Original CC&R's. 
Respondent fails to dispute that Appellant relied upon the covenants contained in 
the Original CC&R's at the time of his purchase of the real property. Respondent also 
fails to contest the nature of the contractual duty to the Appellant which arises from the 
covenants in effect at time of purchase. "A covenant is a duty under the contract, the 
breach of which gives a right to enforce the contract." Weisel v. Beaver Springs Owners 
Ass'n, Inc., 152 Idaho 519,528,272 P.3d 491,500 (2012). 
Respondent fails to dispute the existence of the covenant allowing unlimited 
"rental" as a covenant that runs with Appellant's land. "A covenant represents a meeting 
of the minds and results in a relationship that is not subject to overreaching by one party 
or sweeping subsequent change." Armstrong v. Ledges Homeowners Ass 'n, Inc., 360 
N.C. 547, 554, 633 S.E.2d 78, 84-85 (2006). Respondent also fails to dispute, and it is 
indisputable, that these fundamental principles are precisely consistent with the principles 
adopted in Idaho law. See, Weisel v. Beaver Springs Owners Ass'n, Inc., 152 Idaho 519, 
528, 272 P.3d 491, 500 (2012). 
Here, the District Court failed to engage m any substantive analysis as to 
Appellant's reliance upon the covenants, nor did the District Court engage in any analysis 
to determine the intent, meaning, and legal effect of the existing covenant of "rental." 
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2. The District Court Erred By Failing to Determine the 
Enforceable Rights Promised to the Appellant in the CC&R's 
Because the covenant of unrestricted "rental" originated in the contract in place at 
the time of purchase, i.e. the 1980 CC&R's, the District Court erred by failing to interpret 
and give effect to the original intent of the parties. Armstrong v. Ledges Homeowner 's 
Ass 'n, Inc., 360 N.C. 547, 555-56, 633 S.E.2d 78, 85 (2006). Idaho law is in accord, and 
required that the District Court, when interpreting such covenants, apply the same rules 
of construction as are applied to any contract or covenant. Nordstrom v. Guindon, 135 
Idaho 343, 345, 17 P.3d 287, 290 (2000) (citing Brown v. Perkins, 129 Idaho 189, 923 
P.2d 434, 437 (1996)). The District Court erred by failing to engage in this analysis. 
Further, had the District Court engaged in the substantive analysis, it would 
likewise have been required to resolve all doubts are to be resolved in favor of the free 
use of land. Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354,363, 93 P.3d 685,694 
(2004). 
The District Court's failure to engage in this analysis was error. The correct 
analysis, applying the foregoing legal principals, leads to only one conclusion: Appellant 
is entitled to the benefit of the bargain of unrestricted "rental." 
This foundational legal conclusion, along with the required strict construction7 
protecting the benefit of Appellant's bargain, shapes the correct conclusion: ''This Court 
will not permit the Association to use the Declaration's amendment provision as a vehicle 
for imposing a new and different set of covenants, thereby substituting a new obligation 
for the original bargain of the covenanting parties." Armstrong v. Ledges Homeowners 
Ass 'n, Inc., 360 N.C. 547, 633 S.E.2d 78 (2006). To hold otherwise, would condone the 
1 Armstrong"· Ledges Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 360 N.C. 547,555,633 S.E.2d 78, 85 (2006); Pinehaven 
Planning Bd Y. Brooks, 138 Idaho 826, 70 P.3d 664 (2003) 
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District Court's use of a roving power to rewrite out of the CC&R's, the bargained-for-
benefit held by Appellant. The District Court neither had, nor does it have the roving 
power to re-write the language of the parties bargain. Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, 
LLC., 140 Idaho 354, 93 P.3d 685 (citing Smith v. Idaho State Univ. Fed Credit Union, 
114 Idaho 680,684, 760 P.2d 19, 23 (1988)). 
The District Court failed to engage in an analysis of the legal limitation of the 
authorizing language. Rather, the District Court simply chose to rewrite the amendment 
provision to say: "This Declaration may be amended [and substantially changed) dwing 
the first thirty (30) year period by an instrument signed by not less than sixty-six and two-
third percent (66-2/3%) of the Lot Owners." The decision of the District Court must be 
reversed with direction in accord with the correct legal analysis. 
B. The Respondents' Claims Are Not Founded In the Law 
Respondent misstates the central issue, as one of mere "edits or non-substantive 
corrections".8 Respondent then premises the majority of its argwnent on this distorted 
assertion. Respondent also erroneously asserts "this Court has upheld significant and 
substantial amendments to CC&R's in other cases."9 
Respondent seeks to support its erroneous contention with the following citations: 
1. Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354, 93 P.3d 685 
(2004). Neither Respondent, nor the Court in Shawver, cite the precise language 
of the CC&R's, except the percentage voting requirement, which is not at issue in 
this case. More important, Shawver focuses on a purchase and sale agreement 
and its relationship to the existing CC&R's. Critically, as previously noted above, 
8 Respondents' Brief, p. 8. 
9/d 
5 
in Shawver the appellant did not challenge the validity of the amendment 
provision. Here, the Appellant specifically challenged the validity of the 
amendment provision. As such, the Respondents' reliance upon Shawver to 
support its argument of this Court upholding substantial changes is in error. 
2. Best Hill Coalition v. Halko, LLC, 144 Idaho 813, I 72 P.3d 1088 
(2007): Best Hill was decided upon the issue of whether an ambiguity existed and 
whether new members had provided the necessary consideration to support an 
adoption of the amendments, neither of which is at issue in this case. Moreover, 
the language in the CC&R' s in Best Hill differs markedly from the language at 
issue here. The amendment language is not cited in Best Hill, but is cited in 
Nordstrom v. Guindon, 135 Idaho 343, 17 P.3d 287 (2000), an earlier case that 
dealt with the same subdivision, but a different set of facts. The amendment 
section states: "These restrictive covenants may be altered, amended or deleted in 
whole or in part, if agreed to in writing by seventy-five percent (75%) majority of 
the then parcel owners in Nettleton Estates." Nordstrom supra. (emphasis added). 
Thus Respondents' reliance upon Best Hill or Nordstrom fails, as neither of those 
cases challenged the legal scope or validity of the amendment provision. 
3. Pinehaven Planning Bd v. Brooks, 138 Idaho 826, 70 P.3d 664 
(2003): Pinehaven was decided on the issue of ambiguity, again not at issue in 
this case. The Pinehaven Court interpreted the existing CC&R's, not an 
amendment, as to the validity of an owner renting their property out as a short-
term rental. The Pinehaven Court determined that the CC&R's were not 
ambiguous and clearly allowed short-term renting. Pinehaven is instructive as it 
6 
demonstrates that restrictions are to be strictly construed and interpreted by the 
plain language of the CC&R's. 
4. Respondent asserts, for the first time in the Respondents' Brief that 
"Adams waived any objection to the change in the amendment process" because 
he voted in favor of the 2007 Amendment. 10 This argument is a red herring, 
because the percentage vote requirement is not _at issue in this case. Further, 
Respondents' argument was not raised before the District Court, and is therefore 
waived by Respondent. 
5. Respondents rely on Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed., abridged 
1990, to define "Amend." The complete definition of "Amend" is: "To improve. 
To change for the better by removing defects or faults. To change, correct, 
revise." It cannot be argued that the Second Amended CC&R's did not 
"improve" or remove "defects or faults" from the 2007 CC&R' s. The 2007 
CC&R's, as discussed below, gave the HOA Board the power to enforce the 
existing covenants, which addressed each of the Respondents' complaints. 
6. Responsible Urban Growth v. City of Kent, 123 Wash.2d 375,868 
P.2d 861 (Wash. 1994): Respondent asserts: "Thus, 'amendment' was clearly 
viewed by the court to include additions to covenants." This assertion is patently 
false. Responsible Urban Growth does not address amending CC&R's, and in 
fact, only addresses a city's action with respect to a series of ordinances passed by 
the City Council. Responsible Urban Growth only speaks to defining the term 
"amend" as it relates to the Washington Statutes and the City of Kent Code. The 
case flatly does not address an addition to covenants or restrictions. 
10 Respondents' Brief, p. 12. 
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1. Shafer v. Bd Of Trustees of Sandy Hook Yacht Club Estates, Inc., 
76 Wash. App. 267, 883 P.2d 1387 (Wash. App. 1994): Respondent claims this 
case holds that "amendment" allows "additional CC&R restrictions."11 During 
the discussion of the procedural background, the Court in Shafer discloses that the 
HOA voted to change the amendments to the covenants to be amendments to the 
bylaws, because an amendment to the covenant would require a unanimous vote 
of all the homeowners. 
Footnote 7 to the Shafer opinion is important and instructive here: "At 
oral argument, Sandy Hook acknowledged that the trial court had not addressed, 
and it was not contending, that it had the authority to amend the Original 
Covenants. Thus we limit our opinion to whether Sandy Hook is authorized to 
adopt new restrictions in the nature of restrictive covenants." Id. at 1392. As 
noted above, the restrictions were only adopted by amending the bylaws, not as 
amendments to the CC&R's. 
As important, the Shafer Court concluded that "an express reservation of 
power authorizing less than I 00 percent of property owners within a subdivision 
to adopt new restrictions respecting the use of privately-owned property is valid, 
provided that such power is exercised in a reasonable manner consistent with 
the general plan of the development." Id. (Emphasis added). Respondents' 
reliance on Shafer for allowing additional restrictions by way of amendment, 
while disregarding the language quoted above, is disingenuous. 
8. Harris v. Smith, 250 S.W.3d 804 (Mo. App. 2008): Respondents 
assert that "under Missouri law, CC&R's cannot be amended to add new burdens 
11 Respondents' Brief, p. 15. 
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and restrictions not found in the original covenants." Respondents imply that this 
is Missouri statutory law. The assertion is false. The Harris Court undertakes a 
case law review of five cases, wherein the Court discusses amendatory language 
which includes the word "change." The Harris Court found that the protective 
covenant's amendatory language which allowed for automatic renewal "unless an 
instrument signed by a majority of the then owners of the lots has been recorded 
agreeing to change said covenants in whole or in part" prevented the addition of 
new restrictions. Id at 806. Specifically the Harris Court found that "new 
restrictions ... are invalid." Id. at 810. The Harris opinion supports the Appellant's 
contention that unless amendments are passed unanimously, they are to be judged 
by a reasonableness standard. 
9. Respondent goes on to claim that Shawver and Best Hill actually 
address the language of the CC&R's as providing the authority to include new 
additional restrictions. As demonstrated above, neither case addressed the limiting 
language of"amend" in the CC&R's. 
10. Boyles v. Hausmann, 246 Neb. 181,517 N.W.2d 610 (Neb. 1994): 
Respondents' attempt to distinguish the pending matter from Boyles by an 
incomprehensible distinction between a "declaration" and a "covenant."12 
Respondents' representation of the Boyles opinion is inaccurate. The Boyles 
Court found that the amendatory language "follows the itemization of the land-
use covenants, and the provision refers to 'these covenants' and provides that 
'they' shall be automatically extended, unless the majority changes the 'same.' 
The references throughout this [amendatory] provision refer only to the 
12 Respondents' Brief, p. 17. 
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previously listed covenants." Id at 616. 
The Court in Boyles expressly states: "If a restrictive covenant agreement 
also contains a provision which provides for future alteration, the language 
employed determines the extent of that provision." Id at 612. The Boyles Court 
stated: " ... we find that the unambiguous language of this provision authorizes a 
majority of the lot owners to make changes to existing covenants, but the 
provision does not authorize a majority to add new and different covenants." Id 
at 616. (Emphasis added) 
Respondents' assertion that the 2007 CC&R's at issue in this Case 
specifically allow amendments, which include substantially changed and 
additional restrictions on the rental term and substantially changed additional 
requirements for owners to rent, ignores the express holding in Boyles. 
11. South Ridge Homeowner's Ass'n v. Brown, 226 P.3d 758 (Utah 
App. 2010): Respondents' inclusion of South Ridge in the Respondents' Brief 
implies that South Ridge addresses "amend" or "amendment" to include changes 
and modifications, including additions. 13 South Ridge is irrelevant to this pending 
case. South Ridge simply upholds a specific existing section of a CC&R. South 
Ridge does not address an amendment from allowing unlimited rentals, as is the 
case here, to not allowing rentals. 
12. Armstrong v. Ledges Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc., 633 S.E.2d 78 
(N.C. 2006): Respondent strives to distinguish Armstrong based upon the 
difference between an affirmative covenant (i.e. the imposition of assessments) 
versus a restrictive covenant (i.e. the restriction of property rentals). In support of 
13 Respondents' Brief, p. 18. 
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the Respondents' argument, the respondents' argue that "the amendment was 
merely a further refinement of those limitations to address the problems caused by 
Appellant's use of his property as a vacation rental." 14 As discussed below, the 
Respondent Board had the proper tools in the 2007 Amendment to "address the 
problems caused by Appellant's use of his property as a vacation rental."15 
Respondent further seeks to distinguish Armstrong because ''the 
Armstrong court relied on "a 'reasonableness' standard which has not been 
adopted in ldaho."16 Respondent again cites to Shawver for authoritative 
support. 17 Respondent suggests that the District Court here engaged in some type 
of public policy analysis when, in fact, the District Court engaged in a simple 
declaration, but no analysis of public policy issues. 
Respondents' legal analysis and assertions are incorrect. As noted by Justice 
Schroeder in Shawver, the issue of language limiting the authority for changing the 
CC&R's was never raised nor addressed. 
Respondent implies that no Idaho Court has adopted a reasonableness standard in 
this circumstance. The Respondents are correct, because a survey of Idaho case law 
reveals that no Idaho Court has ever addressed this issue of first impression. 
Glaringly, Respondent fails to address the principles from Armstrong which 
follow Idaho legal principles: 
1. "A covenant represents a meeting of the minds and results in a 
relationship that is not subject to overreaching by one party or sweeping 
14 Respondents' Brief, p. 18-19. 
15 See, ,IC below. 
16 Respondents' Brief, p. 19. 
11 Id. 
11 
subsequent change." Armstrong v. Ledges Homeowners Ass 'n, Inc., 360 N.C. 547, 
554,633 S.E.2d 78, 84-85 (2006). 
2. "Covenants accompanying the purchase of real property are 
contracts which create private incorporeal rights, meaning non-possessory rights 
held by the seller, a third-party, or a group of people, to use or limit the use of the 
purchased property." Armstrong v. Ledges Homeowners Ass 'n, Inc., 360 N.C. 
547,554,633 S.E.2d 78, 85 (2006). 
3. "When a covenant infringes on common law property rights, " 
'[a]ny doubt or ambiguity will be resolved against the validity of the restriction.'" 
( quoting Cummings, 273 N .C. at 32, 159 S.E.2d at 517)); J. T. Hobby & Son, Inc., 
302 N.C. at 71, 274 S.E.2d at 179 ("The rule of strict construction is grounded in 
sound considerations of public policy: It is in the best interests of society that the 
free and unrestricted use and enjoyment of land be encouraged to its fullest 
extent.")" Armstrong v. Ledges Homeowners Ass 'n, Inc., 360 N.C. 547, 555-56, 
633 S.E.2d 78, 85 (2006). 
4. "Declarations of covenants that are intended to govern 
communities over long periods of time are necessarily unable to resolve every 
question or community concern that may arise during the term of years." 
Armstrong v. Ledges Homeowners Ass 'n, Inc., 360 N.C. 547, 557, 633 S.E.2d 78, 
86 (2006). "For this reason, most declarations contain specific provisions 
authorizing the homeowners' association to amend the covenants contained 
therein." Id ( emphasis added). 
12 
5. "The law should facilitate the operation of common interest 
communities at the same time as it protects their long-term attractiveness by 
protecting the legitimate expectations of their members." Armstrong v. Ledges 
Homeowners Ass 'n, Inc., supra, quoting 2 Restatement (Third) of Property: 
Servitudes§ 6 Introductory Note at 71 (2000) (emphasis added). 
6. The Armstrong Court stated: "We conclude that the disputed 
amendment is invalid and unenforceable. In so doing, we echo the rationale of the 
Supreme Court of Nebraska in Boyles v. Hausmann, 246 Neb. 181, 191, 517 
N.W.2d 610,617 (1994): "The law will not subject a minority of landowners to 
unlimited and unexpected restrictions on the use of their land merely because the 
covenant agreement permitted a majority to make changes in existing covenants." 
Here, petitioners purchased their lots without notice that they would be subjected 
to additional restrictions on use of the lots and responsible for additional 
affrrmative monetary obligations imposed by a homeowners' association. This 
Court will not permit the Association to use the Declaration's amendment 
provision as a vehicle for imposing a new and different set of covenants, thereby 
substituting a new obligation for the original bargain of the covenanting parties." 
Armstrong v. Ledges Homeowners Ass 'n, Inc., 360 N.C. 547, 633 S.E.2d 78 
(2006). 
Respondents fail to acknowledge, nor address these substantive analytical issues 
which comport with the 'strict construction' required by the case law of Idaho as to 
covenants.18 
18 Armstrong v. Ledges Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 360 N.C. 547,555,633 S.E.2d 78, 85 (2006); Pinehaven 
Planning Bd V. Brooks, 138 Idaho 826, 70 P.3d 664 (2003) 
13 
Respondents' citation to Hughes v. New Life Development Corp., 387 S.W.3d 453 
(2012), likewise, does not apply in this case, because of the nature of the CC&R's in that 
case which allowed "amendment without substantive limitation." Id at 476. Further, 
Bryant v. Lake Highlands Development Co. of Texas, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 921 (1981) is not 
applicable because the amendment at issue removed property and did not add restrictions. 
Id. 
Likewise, LaBrayere v. LaBrayere, 676 S.W.2d 522 (1984), does not apply 
because there was no challenge to the validity of the amendment language and the 
amendatory authorization specifically allowed "change" and "modification." Id 
Apple II Condominium Ass'n v. Worth Bank and Trust Co., 659 N.E.2d 93 (Ill. 
App. 1995), addressed the specific issue of a condominium which in Illinois "in the 
absence of a provision either in the Amendment or in the original Declaration, 
condominium owners do not have vested rights in the status quo ante." Id at 349. 
Lakemoor Community Club, Inc. v. Swanson, 600 P.2d 1022 (Wash. App. 1979), 
Mission Shores Ass 'n v. Pheil, 166 Cal.App.4th 789, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 108 (2008), and 
Southeastern Jurisdictional Administrative Council, Inc. v. Emerson, 603 S.E.2d 366 
(N.C.2009) do not apply as presented by the Respondents either because of the 
application of state statutory law, which is different than Idaho, the application of a 
differing legal standard not at issue in Idaho, and because of the unique factual 
differences between those cases and the one at bar. 
In Miller v. Miller's Landing, LLC, 29 So.3d 228 (2009), the Alabama Court of 
Civil Appeals addressed for the first time whether a reasonableness test was to be used in 
determining whether a developer could amend the recorded restrictions. The Alabama 
14 
Court found that the reasonableness test applied to amendments made by less than l 00% 
of the owners. This case is instructive, because, as in Alabama, this is a case of first 
impression in Idaho, and this Court must determine whether it will adopt the 
reasonableness standard. 
C. Respondents Fail to Admit That No "Change" In The CC&R's Was 
Necessary to Address the Claimed Issues of Conduct 
Respondents claim that the new and added restrictions on rental were required "in 
order to maintain the nature of the neighborhood."19 Respondents assert the "nature of 
the neighborhood" was threatened by: 1) "taking produce from another's garden;"20 2) 
"excessive noise;"21 and 3) "parking issues."22 
Assuming, arguendo, these acts, reportedly arising from merely two (2) incidents 
on separate days, the question which Respondents fail to address is: "Were there tools 
already in place to address these issues within the existing CC&R's and the law?" 
The unequivocal answer is "Yes". 
The existing 2007 CC&R's23 and the criminal law of Idaho completely addressed 
each of these issues. 
a. "Taking produce" - Common theft is governed by the Idaho 
criminal statutes. All that needed be done was report the theft to the police. It is 
undisputed by Respondent that the record and evidence in this case shows that no 
such report was ever made by anyone in the HOA or by any Owner.24 
19 Respondents' Brief, p. 1. 
20 Respondents' Brief, p. 2. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. .· 
23 R.p.000134-000163. 
24 R. p. 000323, Trans. p. 14, L. 9 - p. I 6, L. 20. 
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b. "Excessive Noise" - "Article 3 - Use and Regulation of Uses." 
Section l{h): "No ·noxious or offensive activity shall be carried on in any 
Dwelling Unit or Common Area, nor shall anything be done therein which may be 
or become an annoyance or nuisance to other Owners. "25 
Further, Article 9, General Provisions, Section 1. Enforcement. Provided 
additional authority for enforcement to the Corporation or any Owner: "The 
Corporation, or any Owner, shall have the right to enforce, by any proceeding at 
law or in equity, all restrictions, conditions, covenants, reservations, . . . now or 
hereafter imposed by the provisions of this Declaration. ,,26 
c. "Parking issues" - are addressed in "Article 3 - Use and 
Regulation of Uses," Section l{b): "Unenclosed parking spaces are restricted to 
use for parking of operative motor vehicles, parking on any portion of the 
Common Area shall be regulated by the Board and shall be shared by all Owners 
on an equitable basis . . . The Board may require removal of ... any other vehicle, 
equipment or item improperly parked or stored. If the same is not removed the 
Board may cause removal at the risk and expense of the Owner thereof." 27 
"Parking issues" are further addressed in "Article 3 - Use and Regulation 
of Uses," Section l(c): "Common drives and walks shall be used exclusively for 
nonnal transit and no obstructions shall be placed thereon or therein expect by 
express written consent of the Board."28 Each of these includes the same 
enforcement authority as referenced above. 
25 R. p. 000138 (Emphasis added). 
26 R. p. 000148 
27 R. p. 000137 
28 R. p. 000137 
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Respondents' assertion that a "substantial change" in the CC&R's was critical to 
"maintain the nature of the neighborhood" is simply untrue. The HOA Corporation, the 
Board, and each Owner already had an existing applicable, enforceable provision to 
address the claimed issue. Yet, the record is devoid of any attempt to use the existing 
covenants to address any of these issues. 
Respondents' asserteq premise that the " ... restrictions are facially reasonable in 
' 
order to maintain the nature of the neighborhood"29 is simply false, when examined in 
light of the 2007 CC&R's 
D. The Amended CC&R's Are Arbitrary and Discriminatory. 
The District Court failed to consider, or address in any fashion, the Appellant's 
arguments as to the arbitrary and discriminatory nature of the amended CC&R • s. 
Respondent suggests that Appellant fails to cite to the record to support his argument. 30 
The District Court did not issue a written ruling for Appellant to cite to. The District 
Court issued an oral ruling from the bench, yet spoke no words regarding the argument as 
to discriminatory and arbitrary issues fully briefed by the Appellant below. Respondent 
is correct: there is no record to cite to because, as correctly asserted by Appellant, the 
District Court simply failed to address these issues, and there is no ruling to affirm. 
Respondent then continues, and asserts: "The Maata holding is irrelevant because 
Idaho does not follow the uniformity rule. "31 This pronouncement of Idaho law is 
consistent with the Respondents' distortion of the law addressed above. No Idaho Court 
has addressed, nor ruled on the uniformity rule. Respondent again cites, Best Hill, supra, 
but that case does not consider the uniformity rule. 
29 Respondents' Brief, p. I. 
30 Id at 21. 
31 Id at 22 (Emphasis added). 
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In a unique twist, Respondent then chooses to assert that this case is all 
Appellant's fault because "Appellant is the party that seeks to upset the .. uniformity of 
development and use" by introducing vacation rentals to the Kimberly One 
neighborhood. "32 
It defies description that the Respondents would assert that the exercise of 
Appellant's undisputed right of unrestricted rental, pursuant to the validly existing 
covenants applicable to all lots, which right of unlimited rental existed from the inception 
of the subdivision, is somehow't.1psetting ''uniformity of development." 
Respondents' position that "each lot" is subject to the new rental restrictions is 
nonsensical. One need only to look to the precise language chosen by the Respondent 
HOA for its actions against the Appellant. The Amendment at issue reads: 
and (g) the Board shall have the authority in its sole and unfettered 
discretion (i) to grant, on a case-by-case basis for reasons of hardship or 
for such other reasons as the Board may deem compelling, a written 
variance from the requirements of this Article 3.1.(a) with respect to 
Rental Activity or Lease of a particular Lot; or (ii) to adopt, repeal, 
amend, enact and enforce as Bylaws or "House Rules" in accordance 
with Article 3.l(k) such other and further rules and regulations as the 
Board in its sole and unfettered discretion may deem necessary to 
regulate Rental Activity for the common good of all of the Owners. "33 
Respondents' claim of ''uniformity" evaporates when examined in light of the 
Respondent HOA Board's "sole and unfettered discretion" to do whatever it "may 
deem compelling" or "may deem necessary" as to "a particular lot." 
A plain reading of the express language used by Respondent in the "Amendment" 
is an unequivocal demonstration revealed by the Respondent's argument show precisely 
32 Id. at24 
33 R. 235-36 (emphasis added). 
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why the Amendment is arbitrary and discriminatory on its face. The District Court's 
failure to address the argument is sufficient legal basis for reversal with direction. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Appellant incorporates by reference its argument with respect to attorney's fees as 
stated in the Appellant's Opening Brief. Assuming, arguendo, that the Court \~'ere to find 
attorney's fees awardable pursuant to the language of the CC&Rs, then in that event, 
upon reversal of the District Court, Appellant is likewise entitled to attorney's fees both 
on appeal and below. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that the decision of the District Court be reversed 
and remanded with direction to the District Court to enter judgment in favor of appellant. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of January, 2015. 
TROUT LAW, PLLC 
Kim J. Trout 
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